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U.C.A. 76-5-205. Manslaughter.
A. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another.

U.C.A. 76-2-103 (3),(4)
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The trial court dismissed the 'manslaughter' charge here at the preliminary
hearing stage. The trial court found particularly that no evidence was introduced to
make a finding of reckless conduct as required. The issue presented here is whether
the trial court's findings should be reversed.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant was accused of manslaughter, which required to the State to
prove at the preliminary hearing that the defendant's conduct was reckless as defined
by statute. The evidence here suggests that this matter was a unfortunate accident
but did not raise to the level of reckless conduct. A gun misfired for unknown
reasons of which the defendant and the police have limited knowledge. The State

failed to produce evidence to suggest that the defendant was consciously aware of the
risk of the gun misfiring and that he consciously disregard the risk.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On June 9, 2000, the defendant came home and joined his sister-in-law in the
living room. They were watching television and drinking some beers. R.36. L. 10.
The victim had purchased the beer and she had consumed about four of the six beers.
R. 11 L. 6.

Other family members had been in the room but had left the two of

them alone at some time. R. 11 L. 12. The two continued to drink and watch
television.
At about 1:15 a.m., the defendant retrieved the gun from a closet at the
victim's request. R. 11 L. 18/ R. 13 L. 1. He handed it to the her and she was
looking and handling the gun. R. 12 L. 17. He heard her activate the slide and this
caught his attention. R. 12 L. 19. He asked for the gun back and she gave it back to
him. R. 12 L. 21. There was nothing that would suggest that she had activated a
round or that the gun was loaded. R . 13 L. 2. He then set back down.
It appeared that the gun was jammed or some material caused it to not shut
fully. R. 13 L. 10. As a result, he pulled the slide back and a full round was ejected
from the gun. He did this to clear in live ammunition. R. 13 L. 11 evidencing to him
that the gun was then safe.
He remembers sitting on the love seat but he was not sure if the gun was at his
hand if it was resting on his leg. R. 13 L. 20. He next remembers a bang. R. 13 L.
22. He then looked over and saw the victim slumped over. R. 13 L. 24.
There was nothing to indicate that the gun was load or in a firing position.
R.14 L. 12.

He had assumed that it was empty and did not have a round in the

chamber and it didn't have a clip in the gun. R. 15 L. 1. He believed the gun was
safe. R. 15 L. 3.
The officer reports that there was nothing to suggest any criminal intent. R. 16
L. 24. The officer advised that from the information he obtained there was nothing
suggesting that he knew the gun was loaded or had a bullet in the chamber. R. 17 L.
4. The officer testified that the gun appeared to have been jammed. R. 18 L. 1. He
referred to another officer, more of an expert in firearms, and the second officer
reported that the gun was jammed. R. 18 L. 10.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The State charged the defendant with manslaughter. This required some
evidence that the defendant was consciously aware the gun in this case would misfire and
he consciously disregarded the risk. The evidence in the case suggest by the testimony of
the State's sole witness that this was an accident and the defendant did not know of the
risks of the gun misfiring. The officer's herein suggest that it was an unfortunate accident
and that the defendant had no knowledge of any risk that the gun would misfire.
The State argues that this Court should take some limited facts and make
inferences to suggest knowledge. The State then argues that these inferences should
override the direct evidence from the police that the defendant did not possess such
knowledge.

ARGUMENT

To bind a defendant over for trial, statutorily the State must show probable
cause at a preliminan hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. State v. Pledger,
896 P.2d 1226. 1229 (Utah 1995); Evans \. State. 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1998).
Although the burden is low for the State, they must produce enough evidence
sufficient to surv ive a motion for directed verdict with respect to each element of the
crime." State \. Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998 The prosecution, at a minimum,
must establish a prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could
conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d at
1229.). Here the critical element is recklessness. The State failed to produce believable
evidence of recklessness. The testimony from the State's sole witness supported the fact
that this was an unfortunate accident and was not reckless behavior.
A trial court should dismiss the charge, as here, if the State did not establish a
prima facie case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992); See
also State \ . Smith.
The prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief
that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. This "reasonable
belief standard allows the magistrate to fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary

hearing of ferreting out groundless and improvident prosecutions. Anderson, 612 P.2d at
783-84: State v. Clark. 2001 Ut 9. 20 P.3d 300.
Application to Case.
The defendant was accused of manslaughter in that he "did recklessly cause the
death of another* in \ iolation of U.C.A. 76-5-505 and not negligent homicide. The
State's burden then was to demonstrate a reckless state of mind and not negligence.
The U.C.A. 76-2-12 defines both reckless and criminal negligence as follows:
(3) Recklessh. or maliciously, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of
but conscioush disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint
B\ the State charging this offense as reckless conduct required the State to prove
that the defendant Was aware9 of the risk and consciously choose' to disregard the risks.
This is as opposed to a criminal negligence standard of which requires that he 'ought to
be aware*.

The State agrees that there is an obligation to give evidence of the 1) subjective
and 2) objective components of the defendant's perception of the risk. They suggest that
they had to prove that the defendant was aware of the risks and secondly he consciously
disregarded the same.

This conforms to the holdings in State v. Standiford, 769 P. 2d

254 (Utah 1988).
The State argues that the evidence reflects that the defendant was aware of the
specific risks. The State argues that the Court should infer such a finding. The basis for
such finding being the defendant retrieving the gun from the victim and that he knew the
gun was mechanicalh amiss. They then suggest that he replaced the bullet in the clip.
(However, the clip was not in the gun.). The inference suggested would have to then
override the direct evidence elicited from the one witness Officer Grothe. This would
also override the inference that the gun was safe since he cleared the action of the gun by
discharging the bullet.
Grothe spoke to these issues directly.
Officer Grothe testified that the defendant did not know that the gun was loaded.
The transcript reports the following:
R. 14
Q. Detective, what did he tell you that would make you think that he knew
that the gun was loaded or in a firing position? R. 14 L. 12.
A. There was nothing that made him think that. L. 15
Q. He didn't think it was loaded? L. 16

A.No.L.H

Contrary to the State's position, the clip was not in the gun.
R.15.
Q. There was no clip in the gun. L.4
A. That's what he stated. L. 5
Q. He advised \ou that the gun was safe. L 6.
A. Yes. L. 7.
The officer agreed that this was mereh an accident.
R.16
Q. Would it be fair to describe this, that this was an accident? L. 21.
A. Yeah
L. 23.

Specifically regarding the gun being loaded, the officer advised:
R.17
Q. And >ou"re telling me from your information you've gathered that he did not
know the gun w as loaded or had a bullet in the firing chamber? L. 1
A. Yes. L.4.
Q. What information do you have to suggest that Mr. Robinson knewr the gun to
have live ammunition in it that could be fire? L. 14
A. There was no information that I have that would have confirmed for sure the
he knew that it was loaded. L. 21.
Q. Did you make any examination of the gun as to its malfunctioning abilities,
or how—was it function properly? Was there any reason to explain why that
bullet would be in that firing position? L. 22.

R.18
A. I'm not a gun expert per se. but from what I saw, it appeared that it had been
jammed. It was a round that had been spent that was in the process of being
ejected out of the gun and got jammed in there. Detective Orndorff, who is
much more skilled person in firearms, he's an instructor, and he looked at the gun
closer than I did. L. 1
Q. What information did Detective Orndorff give you?

A. Other than what I just said. I don't recall any.
Q. That it \\ as jammed?
A. Yeah. L. 10.
The State's direct evidence produce evidence of negligence at best. It failed to
produce any evidence that the defendant was consciously aware of the risk and
conscioush disregarded the same. The magistrate may have the obligation to look
favorabK upon the State's evidence but it has no obligation to go into legal contortions to
find probable cause. The Magistrate need not make inferences when contradicted by
direct testimon>.

CONCLUSION
The State has a low burden of proof at the preliminary hearing level but it still
does have a burden. The State still must satisfy each and every element of the charge
with some quantum of believable evidence.
However, a magistrate is not required to go to such extremes as would require
him/her to override direct testimony of a witness by drawing some inferences that may be
possible but speculate e. The judge still has a job to do and he/she is not simply a slave to
the State's wishes. If the direct testimony states that the defendant did not know of the
risk, the magistrate should not be overturned b\ a speculative inference.
Respectfully submitted this 6lh day of August
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